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NEST LEAVING AND SOCIAL CAPITAL: CHANNELS, HOUSING TENURES AND RESOURCES

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Working paper

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Abstract

Housing shortage can make it difficult for young adults to move away from their parents. This paper investigates nest leaving and to understand resources and channels young adults use to move away from parents, with focus on the role of social capital and informal channels. The study uses a survey of young adults in Sweden that oversampled children of immigrants and measures social capital with the position generator. Results show that both economic and social capital have positive effects on nest leaving. While social capital is linked to the use of contacts and informal, "secondhand", rental agreements, often transmitted via contacts, economic capital is connected to formal housing tenure. The study also indicates that immigrants are more likely to live with their parents, and discusses discrimination as well as social capital shortage as possible explanations. The paper concludes that access to both economic and social capital make it more likely to move away from parents, but that they operate through distinct channels and lead to different housing tenures.

KEYWORDS: Social capital, housing market, housing tenure, nest leaving, allocation mechanisms

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1. Introduction

There is a considerable housing shortage in many European countries and regions, including Sweden where the shortage is especially dire in terms of rental housing suitable for young adults (Boverket, 2013 ; Housing-Europe, 2015),. The process of becoming socially independent usually begins with leaving the parental home, which can be seen as a key step in the transition to adulthood (Buchmann and Kriesi, 2011). Problems in establishing an independent household may lead young adults to live with their parents longer than they desire, affecting the possibility to move to a better labor market or higher education.

The literature on leaving home has identified several important factors in nest leaving, such as economic resources, family structure, gender and enrollment in higher education (Cooney and Mortimer, 1999 ; Nilsson and Strandh, 1999 ; Bernhardt, Gähler and Goldscheider, 2005). Research conducted on the adult population has shown that social capital—understood as access to resources in a social network—is related to specific channels used to search for and obtain housing (Abraham and Kropp, 2000 ; Lin, 2001 ; Röper, Völker and Flap, 2009). However, little research has associated access to social capital and nest leaving. Social capital is relevant in this context since young adults may need to access resourceful alters in social networks to get information, favors or trust needed to obtain a home of their own..

This paper argues that housing is allocated via three mechanisms: markets, networks and organizational principles. What resources are most useful and which channels are used depends on the mechanism that dominates (Aspers, 2011 ; Bourdieu, 2011 [1986]; Hochstenbach and Boterman, 2015). To show this, the paper investigates if social capital is advantageous in the housing market, and contrasts the effect of social capital to the effect of economic capital in channels that may lead to distinct housing tenures. Further, research has shown that immigrants are more likely to live with their parents longer (Nilsson and Strandh,

1999), and there is evidence of discrimination toward immigrants in the housing market (Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008). Although few studies have investigated to what extent immigrants face difficulties in using contacts to obtain a home.

The paper has three aims. First, it examines how access to social capital affects the likelihood for young adults to move away from their parents. Second, it examines how social capital is related to different types of housing tenures as well as the channels used to obtain housing. Third, it investigates if immigrants are as likely as natives to use informal channels and advertisements in the housing market.

This study is contextualized in contemporary Sweden: a case with a housing shortage, a large social housing sector, and rent control (Housing-Europe, 2015), which makes it an interesting context to explore allocation mechanisms. The data consist of young respondents, 22 or 23 years old, who are about to enter or have just entered the housing and labor market. The survey has information for three strata based on the country of birth of the respondents' parents (Sweden, former Yugoslavia, or Iran), enabling the study of nest leaving for children of immigrants from two large immigration groups in Sweden.

2. Theory and previous research

Allocation mechanisms in the housing market

In attaining a home of their own, young adults follow different pathways that lead to a number of different *housing tenures,* e.g., ownership or renting from a private or public landlord. These can be attained through different *channels* such as public housing lists, real estate brokers or contacts. This paper examines how social and economic capital affect the channels used and housing tenure obtained. The resources needed depend on the logic of the dominating principle in the allocation of housing: the market, organizational rules or social

networks (c.f. Polanyi, 2001 [1944]; Aspers, 2011). The market principle allocates housing depending on who offers the most money, and economic capital is usually the recognized form of capital for this type of transaction. A market requires a number of competing customers or sellers (Aspers, 2011), and it can be argued that sellers' priorities to reach all possible buyers in order to get the highest price gives privilege to channels such as private agencies, ads or real estate brokers.

However, to understand access to housing, it is not enough to study prices and economic capital as if there were an idealized market situation. There are reasons to expect that alternative allocation mechanisms are at work. First, many countries use social housing to counteract market forces. Sweden and a number of other countries use the mass model of social housing, meaning that a substantial part of the population lives in such accommodation. This model is different from the residual model that only aims to house the poorest (Harloe, 1995 ; Heijden, 2002). Social housing policies are implemented by a bureaucratic organization that distributes contracts according to formal rules that, in principle, are impersonal (c.f. Weber, 1968 [1922]). The allocation is usually accorded via certain criteria such as waiting time, lottery, family size, poverty or citizenship. In addition, many countries have specific housing only accessible to students. Each criterion implies that certain characteristics and resources (or lack thereof) are necessary to obtain housing. For instance, a lack of resources is often a requirement to get an apartment through the social office. Several channels are used in organizational allocation such as the public housing list, social office and student organizations.

Second, there are several factors to suggest that people use social networks in the housing market. The use of social networks is generally motivated by two principles: as an end in itself or as a means to other ends. The use of networks is an end in itself when the transaction is a favor associated with expectations of reciprocity (Mauss, 2000 [1922]). An example of

this is a relative who stays in an apartment for free. Networks can also be means to other ends. Besides spreading information, networks can reduce problems of risk and uncertainty in transactions. Uncertainty is high in transactions with incentives for opportunistic behavior, such as those with low frequency, those where the quality of a good is difficult to observe (Akerlof, 1970), or those dependent on a contractor's future performance (DiMaggio and Louch, 1998). A transaction embedded in social relations can mitigate these problems because transaction partners can monitor each other's behavior and decide if the relationship contains sufficient interpersonal trust. Fraud is more easily punishable in embedded transactions as the stakes include more than the particular transaction. Bad reputation can spread to other network members and long-lasting relations, such as business partners or friendships, may not recover from fraudulent behavior (Granovetter, 1985 ; Uzzi, 1997 ; DiMaggio and Louch, 1998). However, DiMaggio and Louch (1998) note that within-network exchange also constrains in other ways. Consumers who conduct exchange within their network narrow the field of potential sellers and may trade reliability for price or quality. Thus, while transactions embedded in durable social relations are not optimal for maximizing the price or payment, they can reduce risks.

Those who have well-connected social networks are more likely to learn about available opportunities. Having many contacts is largely an advantage, especially if they possess some kind of housing resource. This can be described as social capital, defined as *resources embedded in a social network that can be used in intentional action.* The effect of social capital on the likelihood to use contacts to obtain housing is supported by previous research from the Netherlands (Röper, Völker and Flap, 2009) and Germany (Abraham and Kropp, 2000).

Housing tenure and channels used to acquire them

To understand when different allocation mechanisms dominate, and which resources and channels are used, one needs to distinguish between different housing tenures and the frameworks regulating each of them. There are two main types of housing tenure: ownership contracts and rental contracts. Among rental contracts, there is a distinction between the formal and informal market (Hochstenbach and Boterman, 2015).[i]

Housing tenures are arguably associated with distinct allocation mechanisms, channels used, and resources. Buying an ownership right typically requires a substantial amount of money, which implies economic risk. Although buyers have incentives to use networks to get information and reduce risks of hidden problems in a house or apartment, sellers have less incentive to do so and would probably opt for an unembedded market solution that may yield higher profit. However, network transactions in the ownership market can also be ends in themselves, for example, when parents buy a house for their child. Ownership markets tend not to have price regulations in Sweden, and the fact that sellers are disincentivized to use social networks implies an expectation that formal market channels are most commonly used.[ii] Previous research by Röper, Völker and Flap (2009) in the Netherlands shows that the most common method for buyers to find a home is through estate agents (29%), closely followed by contacts (28%), and reading or placing ads (18%). Thus, there is a mix of channels used for ownership agreements, but formal channels are more common than networks (informal channels).

In contrast to buyers, renters who aim for formal, firsthand rental contracts do not take a large economic risk, and neither do landlords. Although, social network allocation may also have some relevance. First, network allocation may be an end in itself if landlords want to do a favor for a friend or relative. Second, there are some incentives to avoid risk since the contract

is dependent on future performance. Landlords may want to screen candidates to avoid tenants who will disturb neighbors or not pay rent. Furthermore, social network allocation may be more common under rent control given that prices cannot be raised when demand exceeds supply, and hence there is less to lose as a risk-minimizing strategy. Nonetheless, to the extent that landlords are large bureaucratic organizations, they may strive for formal allocation, especially in the public sector.

Informal, "secondhand" contracts are similar to formal, "firsthand" contracts as tenants do not take a large economic risk, but they differ in that landlords often are individuals without a commercial reputation at stake (DiMaggio and Louch, 1998), or bureaucratic principles of impersonality. This implies a higher risk of fraud in the sense that landlords may not deliver what is expected. From the landlord's perspective, there is a relatively larger risk because they do not have the resources to pursue legal action if they are dissatisfied with the behavior or payment of the tenant. Since both the tenant and the landlord have incentives to reduce risks for these types of deals, it can be expected that using contacts is the most important channel. To sum, it is expected that contacts are used most for secondhand rental contracts, and less so for other housing tenures.

Previous research by Röper, Völker and Flap (2009) in the Netherlands—where, similar to Sweden, the housing market has a large proportion of social housing (Heijden, 2002)—shows that among renters, housing corporations (29%) and municipalities (24%) are the most common channels to find rental contracts. Further, their results showed that renters (21%) used contacts somewhat less than buyers (28%) when obtaining their home. However, in contrast to the present study, they did not distinguish between formal and more informal types of rental contracts.

The effect of resources and discrimination on leaving the nest

Previous research on the role of social capital in nest leaving—or in housing outcomes in general—is scarce. Hochstenbach and Boterman (2015) show in a qualitative study that resources, including social capital, help young adults avoid becoming trapped in precarious housing situations. They also state that while social capital is linked to short-term informal and semi-legal contracts, such informal contracts allow tenants to live in desirable locations. Previous quantitative studies have showed, however, that more social capital does not seem to increase housing satisfaction (Röper, Völker and Flap, 2009). In the present case, it can be expected that people with higher social capital are more likely to obtain informal, secondhand rental contracts, given the argument that they often are acquired through contacts.

Previous research has investigated the role of economic capital in leaving the parents' home. One's own income is positively related to home leaving (Avery, Goldscheider and Speare, 1992), but the effect of parental income on home leaving has mixed or null results (Avery, Goldscheider and Speare, 1992 ; Nilsson and Strandh, 1999 ; Mulder, Clark and Wagner, 2002 ; Bernhardt, Gähler and Goldscheider, 2005 ; van den Berg, Kalmijn and Thomas, Fourthcoming). Avery, Goldscheider and Speare (1992) state that the effect of parental income on nest leaving varies over the life course and find a negative effect for young ages, a positive effect for ages 25-29, and a null effect in between. There is consistent support however for an effect of both one's own income and parental resources on the type of housing tenure obtained once children do leave the nest. Higher individual income, as well as parental income and home ownership, are related to increased likelihood of owning a home rather than being a tenant (Clark and Mulder, 2000 ; Helderman and Mulder, 2007 ; Öst, 2012). Helderman and Mulder (2007) demonstrate that part of this relationship can be explained with general gift giving from parents to children, increasing their possibility of home ownership.

Individuals' main economic activity is also related to home leaving. Going to a university in many cases means changing geographic locations and it can hence be expected that students are more likely to move away from their parents (Chudnovskaya and Kolk, 2017). The effect of one's main economic activity depends on life stage and, while people in higher education tend to move away from their parents, they seldom do so before they have finished upper secondary school (Nilsson and Strandh, 1999).

Previous research also demonstrates that several demographic factors are related to leaving the nest. Children living with both biological parents tend to live at home longer compared to children from other family compositions, particularly those in stepfamily structures (Mitchell, 1994 ; Nilsson and Strandh, 1999 ; Bernhardt, Gähler and Goldscheider, 2005 ; van den Berg, Kalmijn and Thomas, Fourthcoming). Also likely to leave the nest sooner are those who have children of their own (Avery, Goldscheider and Speare, 1992 ; Cooney and Mortimer, 1999) and females (Avery, Goldscheider and Speare, 1992).

Mulder, Clark and Wagner (2002) tested for an urban rural–divide in their comparative study of the USA, Netherlands and Germany and found that the results differed by country of study. In Sweden, Bernhardt, Gähler and Goldscheider (2005) found that young adults growing up in non-metropolitan areas are more likely to move away from their parents, particularly to study.

Another important factor in nest leaving is ethnicity or immigration background. Nilsson and Strandh (1999) show that immigrating or having immigrant parents is negatively related to moving away from parents. While this might be explained with unmeasured cultural factors, it could also be a result of discrimination. Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) show in a field experiment that substantial discrimination occurs in the Swedish rental housing market. They applied for 500 apartments that offered informal rental contracts advertised on a Swedish website. They found that the callback rate was much lower for an Arabic-sounding male name

than for a Swedish-sounding female name. A Swedish-sounding male name also got more responses than the Arabic-sounding male name, but less than the female name. Note that the channel used in this case is a formal one and that no social ties exist between landlords and applicants.

Differences between natives and immigrants can also be explained with inequality in access to social capital, or differences in ability to activate contacts. Contacts may be unwilling to help due to lack of trust or presumptions about ability to pay rent (Smith, 2005). On the other hand, it could be argued that it is less common to statistically discriminate against network members than strangers as one has more information about the former (Mouw, 2002). Furthermore, discrimination is more likely among individuals than companies guided by organizational principles, and less likely to occur through distribution channels such as the public housing list. Thus, it can be expected that there is most discrimination among ads and in the market for informal contracts.

The Swedish case

Market logics do not fully apply to rental agreements in Sweden as they are subject to a form of rent control where rents are negotiated between the owners of a building and the tenants' association (Anas *et al.*, 1985).Besides regular firsthand rental contracts, there are also apartments targeted for specific groups such as the small one-room apartments for students of post-secondary education. There is also an informal type called "secondhand" rental contracts, where firsthand contract tenants sublet their apartment to a new tenant. These contracts are often short term for both legal and practical reasons. Sweden's current housing shortage is more pronounced in metropolitan areas (Boverket, 2013), suggesting that different methods might be used in high-demand urban areas than low-demand rural areas.

Previous research in Sweden on channels used by young adults to obtain their first

accommodation sampled ten Swedish cities and found that the most common channel is through friends and relatives; 22 percent of young adults got their apartment this way and another 10 percent moved in with a partner or friend. It was also common to use private (11.4%) and public (9.6%) housing lists as well as direct contact with private landlords (9.4%). Ownership of different forms was less common for first accommodation, but seven percent were home owners (SOU, 2007).

3. Data and methods

Data

Data for this study are from the second wave of the Swedish survey "Social *Capital and Labor Market Integration: A Cohort Study",* within the LIFEINCON project. The gross survey sample consists of 5,695 individuals selected for telephone interview, carried out by Statistics Sweden and the second wave was fielded from January to March 2013. The population was defined by the Swedish register of the total population for participants born in 1990, meaning that most respondents were 22 years old at the time of the second survey. There are three sub-samples within the sample: (1) all individuals with at least one parent born in Iran, (2) a random selection of 50 percent of all individuals with at least one parent born in former Yugoslavia and, (3) a simple random sample of 2,500 individuals with two Swedish-born parents. The survey was matched with register data containing information about respondents' and parents' incomes, residential area, demographic information and education. In total, 2,244 interviews were conducted in the second wave (used herein) with a response rate of 39.4. Analysis shows that respondents are more likely than non-respondents to have an immigration background, high parental education, higher elementary school grades, completion of upper secondary school, and not to live in a municipality of a large city.

Differences in response rates of observed factors should be less of a problem in a multivariate analysis that includes these factors (Winship and Radbill, 1994).

Variables

Housing outcomes

This study focuses on housing outcomes and the channels used to obtain them. It captures this in two variables measured in three survey items. The first variable measures if the respondent still lives with parents and, if they have moved away, the housing tenure of their current accommodation. This variable is based on two items. The first asks whether the respondent has lived mainly alone or with anyone else during the last twelve months. The second asks in what type of accommodation the respondent lives. There are four categories: firsthand contract, secondhand contract, student room/apartment, and ownership (all forms of ownership contracts are coded into one category). The second variable measures how the respondent acquired their accommodation. Ten alternatives were presented to respondents. Cooperative organizations and illegal "under the table" alternatives were excluded due to few cases. The remaining eight alternatives, as well as the different housing tenures, are presented in table 1.[iii]

[Table 1 about here]

Social and economic capital

Measuring access to social capital hinges on estimating resources embedded in social ties. To measure this potentiality, the study utilizes a methodology called "the position generator" that asks the respondent if it knows anyone in a sample of positions, mostly occupations (Lin, Fu and Hsung, 2001). In this study, there are 40 positions spread over the occupational structure: 39 occupations plus the position of university student. The positions are counted to get the

total number of positions respondents have contact with, i.e. the "extensity", which measures the diversity of social resources respondents have access to and may say something about their total volume of social capital.

Our measure asked about whether the contacts live abroad, in Sweden or both in Sweden and abroad. Contacts living in other countries are less useful, given that most respondents live in Sweden and would have to move abroad to activate the social capital. The analysis thus excludes the positions in which the respondent only knows someone in another country, which is less than ten percent of positions.

The position generator is an established method to measure a generic instrumental dimension of social capital (Van der Gaag, Snijders and Flap, 2008). The idea is that occupation serves as a proxy for the resources that contacts possess. The key resource in this paper is control over real estate assets. Although using occupational positions takes into account alters' differences in access to resources, it may not be a perfect measure of housing resources and could lead to measurement error in estimating social capital for this dimension. Moreover, it is possible that this measurement error differs systematically between groups such as immigrants and natives.

[Table 2 about here]

Measurement of economic capital ideally would include both savings and income but the data do not include a valid measure of savings. Herein, measures of economic capital are based on disposable average income over several years. The information was acquired from tax registers and is defined as post-tax and transfers income, including capital and employment income as well as study grants and loans (SCB, 2009). Both respondent and parental average disposable incomes were measured; the former from 2008 to 2012 and the latter from 1990 to 2012. In cases where respondents lived with parents, respondent income was subtracted from parental (family) income to avoid measuring individual income twice (for the period 2008 to

2012).[iv] The long-term incomes are more reliable and do to some extent proxy for savings, as higher long-term incomes make it possible to save more. Both of these variables are dummy coded to allow for non-linearity of the effects as well as straightforward interpretation. The quartile with lowest incomes is classified as "low-income earners" and the quartile with highest incomes as "high-income earners", where the reference category is "medium-income earners" (defined as the middle 50 percent of the distribution).

Other variables

The models control for a number of variables to avoid confounding the effect of social capital. First, number of siblings, gender, and whether the respondent has children, measured with straightforward survey items. Second, models include immigration background based on parents' registered place of birth. Respondents with at least one parent born in either Yugoslavia or Iran are classified as having an immigration background in the respective country. Third, cohabitation of parents is included and defined by parents that had the same family income in 2012. Forth, the models include human capital to capture earnings potential, measured with the respondent's grade point average in ninth grade of elementary school and retrieved from the educational register. Respondents without grades were given the value zero. Fifth, two dummy variables for "employed" and "studies" are included for the respondent's current main activity (from survey items). Sixth, municipality type is categorized into metropolitan, rural and other municipalities. Three large-city municipalities (Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö) are counted as metropolitan areas.[v] Finally, models control for if respondents and parents reside in the same municipality, measured with data for registered place of residence in 2012. See table 2 for the description of variables.

Analytical strategy

An analysis of the effect of social and economic capital on the likelihood of leaving the nest

should account for the need or desire to use these resources, which can be linked to family structure and respondent's main activity. Family structure and living arrangement are likely to create a certain need or demand for housing. Current main activity, in particular studying, makes it more likely that one moves away from parents (Nilsson and Strandh, 1999 ; Chudnovskaya and Kolk, 2017). Both of these factors lay a foundation for the possibility or necessity to use capital when leaving the nest.

The analysis consists of three parts. The first is a multinomial logit model using "residing with parents" as the base outcome and, for those who moved away, type of housing tenure as the other outcomes. This analysis links the likelihood to move away from parents to the factors that made it possible or necessary. The second analysis compares percentage of respondents in each type of housing tenure to the channels used to obtain them in order to show the relationship between channel and tenure type. The third part uses a multinomial regression, to analyze how channels are linked to resources. The second and the third analyses only include respondents who do not reside with parents, given that the process of obtaining housing is arguably different for those who do live with their parents. The third analysis includes the variable for respondents and parents who live in the same municipality, as social networks, housing lists and other knowledge are local and may be connected to living in the same municipality as one's parents.

The variables measuring housing tenure type and channel to obtain accommodation are nominal as the individual is classified in one of several non-ordered categories. The tables display the average marginal effects from the multinomial regressions. These coefficients represent the increase in predicted probability of having a certain outcome associated with a unit change in the independent variable (calculated over all observations and then averaged), which means that coefficients can be interpreted similarly to coefficients in a linear probability model (OLS).

Description of accommodation arrangements

Table 1 shows distribution of the dependent variables and describes housing tenure, channel and with whom the respondent shares housing. The respondents were 22 or 23 years old at the time of the survey and the table indicates that two thirds of the sample moved away from their parents at this age. Among home leavers, it is about as common to live alone as to live together with a partner, friend or sibling. The proportion of respondents still in the nest differs substantially between those with Swedish-born parents and those who are immigrants; the latter are more than twice as likely to live with their parents, while children born in Sweden of immigrant parents are in between the other groups. Among those who do not live with their parents, there is a similar pattern across all groups. Firsthand rental contracts are the most common (30.4%) and owned apartments second (16.5%), but secondhand rental contracts are relatively uncommon, with only 5.6 percent of the sample. It should also be noted that it is twice as common among children of natives (7.6%) compared to immigrants (3.6%) to live in accommodation with secondhand rental contracts. Table 1 also shows differences in social capital and that there is an advantage of children of immigrants from Iran and Yugoslavia (see paper I).

4. Results

Table 3 displays a multinomial model analyzing factors affecting nest leaving and—for those who did leave—housing tenure of the obtained accommodation. Coefficients for the effect of social capital indicate that having a more extensive network has a negative effect on the likelihood to live with parents and a positive effect on the likelihood to have a secondhand rental contract. This result suggests that the effect of social capital on secondhand rental contracts can explain why people with higher social capital are more likely to have moved away from their parents. One additional standard deviation in extensity (6.95) results in a 1.5 percentage point higher likelihood of having a secondhand rental contract, which can be compared to the 5.6 percent of nest leavers who live in these apartments.

Models in table 3 also indicate that immigrants and children of immigrants are more likely to live with their parents at this age. Analyzing housing tenure of those who moved, we see that there is a negative effect for firsthand and secondhand rental contracts as well as home ownership for first generation immigrants, but those born in Sweden to two immigrant parents only have negative effects for the two types of rental contracts. A comparison of the strength of average marginal effects should take the base probability into account. For immigrants and children of immigrants, the relative negative effects, compared to the average, are largest for secondhand rental contracts (0.037/0.056=0.66) followed by firsthand rental contracts (0.070/0.304=0.23), suggesting that this group has more difficulties in obtaining secondhand rental contracts compared to other types and that this difference is substantive in relative terms.

[Table 3 about here]

Table 3 also displays the effects of the two measures of economic capital. Low-income earners are more likely and high-income earners less likely to live with their parents

compared to medium-income earners. Respondents with low incomes are significantly less likely to live in firsthand rental contract accommodation compared to medium-income earners, but respondents with high incomes are significantly more likely. The results for ownership show that there is a significant effect for high-income earners but not for low-income earners, suggesting that young adults need to belong to the top 25 percent of incomes to afford to buy accommodation. The table also displays results for parental income and shows that this variable does not have an effect on the likelihood to move away from home, but it does have an effect on housing tenure. Respondents with high-income parents tend to live in owned accommodation while those with medium-income parents rely more on firsthand rental contracts. Interestingly, there is no effect of either of the economic capital variables on secondhand rental contracts, suggesting that income is not the most important resource for this type of housing tenure.

The family structure also has important effects. Cohabitating parents increase the likelihood that their child still lives with them, while respondents who themselves are parents are substantially less likely to do so and instead more likely to own or live in firsthand rental contract apartments. The table also displays results for municipality type and shows that secondhand rental contracts are overrepresented among people living in the three large-city municipalities.

[Table 4 about here]

Table 4 displays a cross tabulation of channels used to obtain housing and housing tenure. We see that real estate brokers dominate for owned accommodation, but that “other” channels also are quite common. Private agencies and ads are used for all types of contracts but are most common for first and secondhand rental contracts. Tips via contacts are very common (59%) for secondhand rental contracts, somewhat common for firsthand rental contracts

(27%), and less common for owned accommodation (13%). Thus, contacts are more often used for rental contracts, especially the more informal secondhand rental contracts, which is in line with the theoretical prediction.

[Table 5 about here]

Table 5 displays a multinomial regression analyzing the relation between channels used to acquire housing and social and economic capital. First, we see that social capital matters for search methods and higher social capital has a significant effect on the likelihood of acquiring a home via contacts. This supports the expectation that higher social capital increases the likelihood to use a contact. An effect of 0.006 implies that an extra standard deviation in extensity increases the likelihood of having found the apartment via contacts by 4 percentage points, which can be compared to the fact that on average 24 percent of the nest leavers used this channel to obtain their home. Interestingly, the results show that living in the same municipality as parents has a significant effect on using contacts, which suggests additional local factors not captured in the social capital measure. Thus, social capital matters for the type of home young adults live in as well as the channel used to acquire it.

Second, the model analyzes economic capital and the results show that there is an effect of individual income as well as family income on finding a home via real estate brokers, suggesting that this is the main channel for economic capital. Interestingly, parental income also has an effect on the likelihood to use "other" channels. One probable explanation of "other" channels is that parents buy accommodation for their children. Third, results indicate that use of contacts is more common in both metropolitan and rural areas. This suggests that contacts are useful both when demand is high and when it may be difficult to find buyers or tenants. Fourth, immigrants are significantly less likely to get tips via contacts, and more often use the public housing list. Children of two immigrants are also significantly less likely to use

contacts, but there is no positive effect of the housing list. Instead, they more often use "other" channels and real estate brokers. The expectation was that there would be a negative effect for immigrants, with likelihood to use ad channels, but the negative effects are not significant. Respondents with one immigrant parent differ less compared to natives, but are also significantly more likely to use the housing list. On the basis of these results, there is limited support for the expectation that respondents with immigrant backgrounds would be less likely to use ads. The expectation that immigrants have difficulties using contacts has more support, as there are significant negative coefficients for two of the three groups with immigrant backgrounds. Note that these results are conditioned on social capital, but taking this variable out does not change the result since the social capital differences between groups are limited and advantage immigrants (see table 1).

5. Discussion

This paper has investigated the effect of social capital on nest leaving, as well as housing tenure and the channels used to obtain it. The paper contributes to previous literature by showing that people with higher social capital are more likely to move away from their parents, and that they move into accommodation with informal secondhand rental contracts. Results show that people with higher social capital more often use contacts to obtain their accommodation. The results also confirm previous research regarding the role of family structure and economic capital. Cohabitating parents make it less likely to leave the nest, while having children of one's own makes it more likely to do so. Results for economic capital show that people with higher individual economic capital are more likely to move away from their parents, and that parental economic capital is related to the type of housing tenure one obtains, but not to the likelihood to move out.

This paper has demonstrated the specific role of social capital differentiated from the effect of economic capital. The study used extensity of occupational contacts as the main measure of social capital and showed that this measure had the effects theoretically expected from a social capital measure: it was related to a higher likelihood to use tips via contacts as the channel, which leads to a higher likelihood of ending up in secondhand rental contracts. However, this is not to say that this measure of social capital captures all relevant dimensions. The result that showed people living in the same municipality as their parents are more likely to use contacts indicates possible aspects of social capital that this measure did not capture. An explanation for this might be that although the position generator discriminated between national and transnational contacts, it did not discriminate between local and national contacts, and contact usefulness may depend on geographic proximity. Furthermore, the data unfortunately do not include a measure of parental social capital and there could be a

component of social capital related to parents' networks that explains why those living near parents use contacts more often.

Like previous research, this paper showed that higher parental economic capital is related to the likelihood of owning an apartment (Helderman and Mulder, 2007). This type of economic capital, bounded in strong ties, can be viewed as a hybrid form of social and economic capital. It can be noted that while parental income affected ownership and use of formal real estate brokers there was also an effect through "other" channels, suggesting informal channels such as living in an accommodation owned by your parents.

The results indicated that immigrants more often live with their parents and less often use tips via contacts. This could not be explained with social capital disadvantage as those with immigrant backgrounds access equal or more social capital compared to children of natives. A possible explanation is that they use their accessible social capital less. However, limitations to the measure of social capital should also be kept in mind. It could be the case that measurement error is larger for immigrants given the tendency for in-group interaction and the overrepresentation of natives among owners of housing capital—something that the position generator used here may be unable to show. A better measure of social capital that estimates housing wealth could explain some of the difference between natives and immigrants in contact use. Thus, it is a task for further research to try to disentangle the role of discrimination from lack of networks in the informal housing market.

Results showed that people with high social capital have easier access to housing. If attractive areas are more accessible, not only to those with more financial capital, but also those with more social capital, it suggests residential segregation with respect to social capital. This dimension of segregation is seldom discussed in previous research and the consequences of such segregation could be political cleavages, lack of trust or cohesion or labor market

difficulties for inhabitants of areas where people with lower social capital live (c.f. Hochstenbach and Boterman, 2017).

In conclusion, this paper has discussed that in the face of housing shortage young adults can have difficulties in nest leaving and demonstrated that access to social and economic capital explains the likelihood to move away from parents. Results indicated that social capital is associated with using contacts and gives access to secondhand contracts while economic capital gives access to the ownership market. Thus, this paper demonstrates that social and economic capital complement each other in the housing market as both affect residential outcomes, but through different channels and with different types of housing tenure as the result. Social ties in the right places are clearly advantageous, including in the housing market.

Notes

[i] Informal ownership, like squatters, is very rare in the Swedish context.

[ii] Sellers may however also benefit from a network solution if the expectation of buyers is that there is fraud, which then is reflected in prices. In such cases, network transactions could result in an equal or higher price for high quality housing (c.f. Akerlof, 1970).

[iii] The question was: how did you obtain your accommodation? [My translation] (in Swedish: Hur har du fått tag i ditt boende?).

[iv] Statistics Sweden calculates family income as the sum of the income of all family members living at the same address, and to which household the respondent belongs is here determined by measuring where the respondent resided in 2006. SCB defines "family" as a unit of people who are living in the same real estate and have a relation, either married, in a civil union, have children together or a child/parent relationship.

[v] This classification is based on municipality groups that reflect structural conditions such as population size, labor market opportunities and industrial structure (SKL, 2011).

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TABLES

Table 1 - Description of the focus variables

	Swedish born parents	Born in Sweden with one immigrant parent	Born in Sweden with two immigrant parents	Immigrant	All
	%	%	%	%	%
Social capital					
Total extensity in Sweden	16.66	16.975	18.28	17.36	17.15
Shares housing with					
Parents	21.17	26.79	43.65	48.62	32.71
Alone	34.52	36.36	29.7	22.66	30.79
Siblings	0.56	2.39	3.3	2.25	1.65
Relatives	0.38	1.44	1.27	1.04	0.8
Partner	33.77	26.32	14.72	20.93	26.43
Friend	9.03	6.22	6.6	3.63	6.95
Other	0.19	0.48	0.51	0.69	0.4
Missing	0.38	0	0.25	0.17	0.27
Housing tenure or living with parents					
Live with parents	21.17	26.79	43.65	48.62	32.71
Firsthand rental contract	35.37	34.45	21.32	25.95	30.39
Secondhand rental contract	7.62	5.74	3.05	3.63	5.61
Owned Apartment/House	20.88	15.31	15.74	9.52	16.53
Student housing	12.42	15.79	12.69	10.21	12.21
Other	1.98	1.91	3.05	1.9	2.14
Missing	0.56	0	0.51	0.17	0.4
Channel - How housing was acquired					
Live with parents	21.17	26.79	43.65	48.62	32.71
Bought, real estate broker	11.29	8.13	9.9	3.63	8.78
Ads	5.64	7.18	2.54	2.6	4.46
Tips via contacts	20.7	16.75	10.15	9.17	15.51
Housing list	16.56	20.57	11.68	17.13	16.22
Private agency	9.13	5.74	6.35	6.57	7.66
Via social office	0.47	0.48	1.27	1.21	0.8
Via student organization	3.29	4.31	4.06	2.08	3.21
Other (Annat...)	9.97	8.13	9.14	6.92	8.87
Missing	1.79	1.91	1.27	2.08	1.78
N	1063	209	394	578	2244

Table 2 - Independent variables

Variable	mean	min	max	sd
Extensity of contacts in Sweden	17.15	0	39	6.95
Low ind. economic capital	0.25	0	1	
High ind. economic capital	0.25	0	1	
Low family economic capital	0.25	0	1	
High family economic capital	0.25	0	1	
Woman	0.48	0	1	
First generation immigrant	0.26	0	1	
Second generation immigrant	0.18	0	1	
Born in Sweden with one immigrant parent	0.09	0	1	
Elementary school grade point average	203.69	0	320	74.67
Studies	0.48	0	1	
Employed	0.611	0	1	
Number of siblings	2.05	0	11	1.43
Mother and father live in the same household	0.58	0	1	
Parent	0.05	0	1	
Lives in a different municipality than parents	0.274	0	1	
Metropolitan municipality	0.209	0	1	
Rural municipality	0.248	0	1	

Table 3 – Leaving the nest, housing tenure and social capital (AME)

	Lives with parents	Firsthand rental contract	Second-hand rental contract	Owned Apartment/ House	Student housing	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gender						
Woman	-0.092***	0.047*	0.010	0.040*	-0.032*	0.006
Immigration background (Ref=Swedish born parents)						
First generation immigrant	0.204***	-0.070**	-0.037**	-0.059*	-0.001	-0.007
Born in Sweden with two immigrant parents	0.189***	-0.121***	-0.058**	0.016	-0.002	0.007
Born in Sweden with one immigrant parent	0.034	-0.010	-0.028	-0.031	0.018	-0.006
Main activity						
Employed	0.083***	-0.026	0.007	0.016	-0.050***	-0.006
Studies	-0.074***	-0.059*	-0.002	-0.065***	0.149***	-0.006
Human capital						
Elementary school grade point average/100	-0.036*	-0.041*	-0.010	0.041**	0.032*	-0.010
Family structure						
Number of siblings	0.004	0.006	0.001	-0.023***	0.006	0.002
Mother and father live in the same household	0.074***	-0.022	-0.013	-0.015	-0.022	-0.005
Have children of their own	-0.597***	0.227***	0.015	0.290***	-0.053	0.003
Ind. economic capital (Ref=Medium income)						
Low (Q1)	0.150***	-0.073**	-0.007	-0.033	0.017	-0.009
High (Q4)	-0.101***	0.067**	-0.004	0.058**	-0.020	-0.007
Family economic capital (Ref=Medium income)						
Low (Q1)	-0.021	0.035	-0.012	-0.023	0.018	0.016*
High (Q4)	-0.005	-0.067**	-0.005	0.060**	0.029	0.008
Social capital						
Extensity of contacts in Sweden	-0.003*	0.000	0.002*	0.001	0.001	-0.000
Municipality type (ref=Medium-sized city)						
Metropolitan	0.000	-0.023	0.032**	0.028	-0.028	-0.003
Rural	0.039	0.023	-0.010	0.023	-0.004	-0.006
Average base probability	0.327	0.304	0.056	0.165	0.122	0.021
Observations	2,114	2,114	2,114	2,114	2,114	2,114

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Average marginal effects from a multinomial model with living with parents as the base outcome

Table 4 - Cross tabulation of channel and housing tenure

	Firsthand contract	Secondhand contract	Owned	Student housing	Other	Total
Via a real estate broker	0.6	0.0	52.6	0.4	0.0	13.4
Ads	6.2	14.4	6.6	4.8	8.9	6.8
Tips via contacts	27.4	59.2	13.4	11.9	24.4	23.7
Housing list	37.7	2.4	1.1	39.3	0.0	24.8
Private agency	12.9	11.2	7.1	14.8	13.3	11.7
Via social office	0.9	3.2	0.0	1.1	11.1	1.2
Via student organization	2.7	0.0	0.3	19.3	2.2	4.9
Other	11.6	9.6	18.9	8.5	40.0	13.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	665	125	365	270	45	1,470

Note: This table only includes respondents not living with their parents the last twelve months.

Table 5 - Channel used to obtain accommodation and social capital (AME)

	Bought/ real estate broker	Ads	Tips via contacts	Public: Housing list	Private agency	Via social office	Via student organization	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Gender								
Woman	0.028	0.024^	0.017	-0.037	0.017	-0.000	-0.031**	-0.019
Immigration background (Ref=Swedish born parents)								
First generation immigrant	-0.032	-0.022	-0.090**	0.097**	0.008	-0.006	0.000	0.045^
Born in Sweden with two immigrant parents	0.057*	-0.036	-0.084*	-0.023	-0.012	0.009	0.026	0.064*
Born in Sweden with one immigrant parent	-0.018	0.017	-0.023	0.078*	-0.062^	-0.007	0.014	-0.001
Main activity								
Employed	0.022	0.007	0.028	-0.057*	0.010	-0.022**	0.001	0.011
Studies	-0.045*	-0.004	-0.033	0.014	0.002	-0.012^	0.132***	-0.054*
Human capital								
Elementary school grade point average/100	0.047**	0.005	-0.017	-0.006	-0.016	-0.015***	0.006	-0.004
Family structure								
Number of siblings	-0.012	-0.001	-0.000	0.010	0.003	0.001	0.003	-0.003
Mother and father live in the same household	0.012	0.009	-0.019	-0.004	0.035^	-0.005	0.006	-0.034
Have children of one's own	0.180	-0.022	0.002	0.242	0.008	0.001	-0.517	0.107
Ind. economic capital (Ref=Medium income)								
Low (Q1)	-0.002	0.019	-0.021	-0.014	0.011	-0.010	0.027*	-0.010
High (Q4)	0.063**	0.023	-0.013	-0.029	-0.011	-0.014	-0.017	-0.001
Family economic capital (Ref=Medium income)								
Low (Q1)	-0.011	0.030	-0.003	-0.012	0.008	0.007	-0.033^	0.014
High (Q4)	0.045*	-0.023	-0.051^	-0.047	-0.015	-0.002	0.017	0.075**
Social capital								
Extensity of contacts in Sweden	0.001	-0.000	0.006***	-0.001	-0.002^	-0.000	-0.001	-0.002
Municipality type (ref=Medium-sized city)								
Metropolitan	0.037^	-0.014	0.075**	-0.069*	-0.007	-0.012	-0.017	0.008
Rural	-0.041	0.014	0.063*	-0.051^	0.005	-0.020^	-0.000	0.031
Distance to parents								
Lives in a different municipality than parents	-0.020	0.009	-0.068**	0.042^	0.021	0.006	0.036**	-0.024
Average base probability	0.134	0.068	0.237	0.248	0.117	0.012	0.049	0.135
Observations	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10. Average marginal effects from a multinomial model

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